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We explore the benefits of intergenerational risk-sharing through both private funded 
pensions and via the public debt. We use a multi-period overlapping generations model with a 
PAYG pension pillar, a funded pension pillar and a government. Shocks are smoothed via the 
public debt and variations in the indexation of pension entitlements and the pension 
contribution rate, which both respond to funding ratio of the pension fund. The intensity of 
these adjustments increases when the funding ratio or the public debt ratio get closer to their 
boundaries. The best-performing pension arrangement is a hybrid funded scheme in which 
both contributions and entitlement indexation are deployed as stabilisation instruments. We 
find trade-offs between the optimal use of these instruments. We also find that entitlement 
indexation and the response of the tax rate to public debt movements are complements. We 
compare different taxation regimes and conclude that a regime in which pension benefits are 
taxed, while contributions are paid before taxes, is preferred to a regime in which 
contributions are paid after taxes, while benefits are untaxed. 
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1 Introduction
Pension arrangements have moved to the top of the policymaking agenda over the past
decade. Particular attention is given to the question how arrangements can be adapted to
deal with the ongoing ageing of the population and the costs associated with it. Therefore,
many countries have started to shift away from unfunded to funded pension arrangements.
The latter often take the form of a Defined Contribution (DC) scheme. Moreover, other
countries that already have a substantial funded pension pillar are now shifting away from
Defined Benefit (DB) towards Defined Contribution. The consequence is that the extent to
which individual risks can be shared is becoming more limited. In fact, an individual DC
scheme in its purest form does not admit any risk sharing among its participants. With
the decreasing capacity of pension arrangements to share risks among different cohorts the
question also arises whether there exist alternative channels through which such risks can
be shared.
In this paper, we investigate intergenerational risk sharing via both private funded
pension arrangements and via the government debt. An important question is to what
extent variations in the public debt can substitute for risk sharing via a DB funded pension
arrangement. A priori we might expect that if intergenerational risk-sharing through the
pension system is reduced, there is more need for intergenerational risk-sharing through
fiscal policy. Unexpected bad shocks can be smoothed by limiting the increase in taxes
and allow for a rise in the public debt. This way future generations will be forced to pay
part of the bill. Vice versa, if a good shock hits pension fund participants.
We conduct our analysis in the context of an overlapping generations (OLG) model
with a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension pillar, a funded pension pillar and a government.
We assume a fluctuation band on both the funding ratio (the ratio of assets over liabilities)
of the pension fund as well as on the public debt, while allowing for three margins of
adjustment. These are the pension contribution rate, the indexation of pension entitlements
and the adjustment of the taxes. The intensity of the various adjustments is allowed to
increase when the funding ratio or the debt ratio get closer to the boundaries of a band
we assumed to be imposed upon them.
We obtain a number of results. First, we observe that among the collective schemes, the
hybrid scheme, which allows both contributions and indexation of pension entitlements to
respond to funding ratio imbalances, performs better than the collective defined contribu-
tion (CDC) scheme, which holds contributions constant, and the DB scheme, which holds
indexation constant. The advantage of the hybrid scheme is that by having both contri-
butions and indexation respond to funding ratio imbalances, the volatility of consumption
during working life and during retirement can be better balanced. Second, there are trade-
offs concerning the parameters regulating the pension contribution and the indexation of
entitlements. For a CDC scheme, it is optimal to have indexation respond strongly to devi-
ations in the funding ratio from its target, while the opposite is found when the contribution
reacts relatively strongly to such deviations. Further, for given indexation parameter, we
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find an internal optimum for the responsiveness of the contribution to the funding ratio.
Finally, we observe that the degree of indexation of entitlements and the responsiveness of
the tax rate to deviations of debt from its target are complements. Stronger indexation
of pension rights implies larger movements in the retirement benefits, hence larger fluctu-
ations in tax revenues, thereby necessitating stronger adjustments in the tax rate. Third,
while the hybrid collective scheme dominates individual DC overall in terms of welfare,
the latter scheme is associated with lower consumption volatility and on this account in-
dividual DC is the best-performing scheme. Hence, the opportunity to share risks across
generations may actually come at the price of higher consumption volatility. Fourth, the
degree of riskiness of the pension fund’s asset portfolio affects the volatility of tax revenues
under the EET scheme, thereby affecting the optimal tax adjustment parameter.
This paper connects to different strands of literature. First, it relates to the literature
on intergenerational risk-sharing. There is already quite a substantial amount of work
that studies intergenerational risk-sharing within a funded pension scheme. Examples
are Teulings & Vries (2006); Gollier (2008) and Cui et al. (2011), who show how a well-
designed pension fund improves welfare. By exploiting the benefits of intergenerational
risk-sharing, more risk can be taken, which results in higher expected returns. As in
this paper, these contributions use a multi-period OLG model with consumption equal to
net income. By contrast, Draper et al. (2011) use a multi-period OLG model in which
households can also save outside their pension fund. They show that a DB pension scheme
is welfare improving in terms of risk-neutral valuation, but not in terms of market valuation.
Therefore, in the absence of mandatory participation, the fund suffers from a commitment
problem. In contrast to these contributions, the current paper allows for PAYG social
security benefits as an additional source of retirement income, while, more importantly,
it allows for the government’s budget as an additional channel for intergenerational risk
sharing. In particular, by only taxing retirement savings during the pay-out phase, future
generations sharing in equity risks through variations in the public debt.
There is a fairly small literature that explores the combination of a PAYG public
pensions and funded pensions. Examples are Matsen & Thøgersen (2004); Borsch-Supan
et al. (2006) and Beetsma & Bovenberg (2009). Matsen & Thøgersen (2004) investigates
the optimal split between a PAYG pillar and a DC funded pillar in the context of two-
OLG model with wage income, the population size and the equity return as the risk factors.
The current paper only considers equity risk. However, in contrast to Matsen & Thøgersen
(2004), who evaluates welfare only in the second period of an individual’s life, the current
paper evaluates welfare of future generations over many periods, including the working
years. Borsch-Supan et al. (2006) study the effects of ageing and pension reforms on
international capital markets using an OLG model with multiple countries. They find
that aggregate savings rates go up due to population ageing, which can be amplified by a
pension reform in which the PAYG contributions are frozen and its benefits are reduced.
Beetsma & Bovenberg (2009) also investigate a two-OLG model with a PAYG and a funded
pillar. Human capital is a non-tradable asset. In a pure market economy the young
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possess too much human capital and too little financial capital. Hence, it is optimal for
them to acquire more equity exposure. A pension fund can raise welfare by effectively
making human capital tradable, thereby completing the asset markets, and by allowing
the incoming young to engage in asset trading with the old generation. Hence, the pension
fund yields the benefit of intergenerational risk-sharing. The authors show that in general
only a DB fund can achieve optimal risk sharing. By contrast, the current paper shows
that pure DB arrangements are unstable and, hence, a hybrid between DB and DC scheme
is preferable. Under the hybrid scheme, both the pension contribution and the benefit are
employed to absorb financial risk. Further, and importantly, none of the aforementioned
articles consider the public debt as a separate channel for intergenerational risk sharing.
Hence, the current paper contributes to the literature on multi-pillar pension schemes by
allowing for public debt to fulfil this role.
This paper also connects to the literature on the taxation of pensions. Governments can
stimulate pension savings through their tax policies. For example, in most OECD member
countries (Whitehouse, 1999), we observe that pension savings are tax exempt. This paper
considers the role of intergenerational risk-sharing through retirement income and public
debt under two tax regimes. These are the “TEE regime”, under which pension fund
contributions are levied on after-tax income, while the accumulation and pay-out phases
are tax exempt, and the “EET regime”, under which contributions are levied on before-tax
income, the pension wealth accumulation phase is tax exempt, while the benefits themselves
are taxed. Most OECD member countries facilitate or even stimulate the accumulation of
pension wealth by making pension contributions tax deductible (up to a certain limit) and
taxing the pension benefits. Hence, these countries follow at least partly the EET regime.
We will see that the potential for intergenerational risk-sharing depends substantially on
which taxation regime prevails. Gordon & Varian (1988); Bohn (1999); Shiller (1999);
Smetters (2006) and Ball & Mankiw (2007) show that a government holding equity or
taxing capital returns can improve welfare. Whitehouse (1999) makes a case for both the
TEE and the EET regime, as they tax either when contributions are paid or when benefits
are obtained. This way, the consumption - savings decision during the accumulation phase
is undistorted. In Huang (2008) no contributions are paid during accumulation and the
marginal tax rates during work and retirement are identical, implying that the EET and
TEE regimes are equivalent. However, Beetsma et al. (2011) highlight circumstances in
which the equivalence breaks down. For example, the marginal tax rate during retirement
is typically lower than during working life. Hence, pension savings are more attractive
under the EET regime. Furthermore, the government also shares in the asset market risk
under the EET regime, thereby affecting the risk-taking of the pension fund. Romaniuk
(2013) analyses the optimal pension fund portfolio assuming that utility in retirement
is maximized. The taxes levied under the TEE regime do not affect this optimization
problem, while those under the EET regime do. Again, the equivalence between the two
regimes breaks down. In contrast to Romaniuk (2013) we take the composition of the fund’s
investment portfolio as given, while focussing on the role of the various adjustment channels
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for intergenerational risk sharing and social welfare. In the context of our framework we
show that taxing income after pension contributions have been paid raises social welfare,
because the resulting additional investment in pension wealth earns the equity premium,
while the reduction in future taxes by paying pension contributions on after-tax income
effectively only earns the risk-free rate of return through a reduction in the public debt.
This effect outweighs the higher consumption volatility under the EET relative to the TEE
regime. Hence, for the various pension regime settings the EET regime welfare dominates
the TEE regime.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 lays out the model, while
Section 3 presents the calibration. In Section 4 we discuss our social welfare criterion. The
outcomes of the analysis are found in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude the main
text of this paper. Some technical details are found in the Appendix.
2 The model
The model features overlapping generations with identical agents in each generation. Each
period a new generation of unity mass is born. During the first part of their life individuals
work, while during the second part they are retired. Retirement benefits are provided by
a first pillar that pays a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social-security benefit and a second pillar
formed by a pension fund. Labour supply is exogenous and normalised to unity at the
individual level. Hence, the total amount of labour supplied by a working cohort is also
unity. The only exogenous risk factor is the return on a risky asset referred to as equity.
There are two assets, namely equity and a risk-free asset. Finally, the variables in our
model are expressed in real terms.
2.1 Individuals
An individual lives for TD periods in total. At the start of his life an individual born in





where δ is the discount factor and ct,ν is consumption. Period utility is given by the





Before retirement the individual receives each period an exogenous wage income of
unity and he pays a social security tax, while after retirement he receives a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) social security benefit. The individual does not save voluntarily. All his savings
are channelled to a pension fund. This assumption is not as unrealistic as it may seem,
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because in countries with large funded pension pillars, like the Netherlands, we tend to see
relatively little free savings outside those pillars.
We consider two different regimes for the taxation of the pension income received from
the funded pension pillar. Under the first regime pension contributions are paid after taxes
have been levied on income and the pension benefits are untaxed. The accumulation of
pension wealth is also untaxed. This regime is called the “tax-exempt-exempt” (TEE)
regime. Under this regime, the individual’s consumption profile is given by:
ct,ν =
{
1− (λ+ pt + τt,ν) , t− ν ∈ {0, ..., TR − 1} (working)
ζ + πt,ν , t− ν ∈ {TR, .., TD − 1} (retired)
, (3)
where λ is the social security tax, pt is the pension contribution, τt,ν a tax payment to
the government, TR is the number of working periods, ζ is the social-security benefit and
πt,ν is the pension benefit. Retirement thus takes place in period ν + T
R. Under the
other tax regime, the “exempt-exempt-tax” (EET) regime, the pension contribution is
subtracted from income before taxes are paid, while the pension benefit is taxed. Again,
the accumulation of pension wealth is untaxed. In this case,
ct,ν =
{
(1− pt) (1− τt,ν)− λ, t− ν ∈ {0, ..., TR − 1} (working)
ζ + (1− τt,ν)πt,ν , t− ν ∈ {TR, .., TD − 1} (retired)
, (4)
Regarding the pension fund, we also distinguish two cases. The first is the case of an
individual DC (IDC) fund, where the individual pays a fixed contribution (pt = p̄) during
the working period and converts his pension assets into an annuity at retirement. The
second case is that of a collective pension fund, where pension rights are indexed. The




(1 + It) bt,ν (collective)
, (5)
where at,ν is the annuity payment and (1 + It)bt,ν is the indexed pension benefit, where It
is the rate of indexation, which is defined below.
2.2 Retirement arrangements
This subsection discusses the details of the retirement arrangements.
2.2.1 The first pillar
Because of the PAYG character of the first pillar, each period total contributions by the
working cohorts equal total benefit payments to the retired:
λTR = ζ(TD − TR). (6)
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2.2.2 The IDC second pillar
The second pillar consists of a pension fund. First, we consider the IDC arrangement
and denote by Wt,ν the pension asset holdings at the beginning of period t in the IDC
scheme. Individuals start with zero initial asset holdings, i.e. Wν,ν = 0. Each period of
their working life they add their pension contribution to these asset holdings, which are
invested in risk-free debt and risky equity. Hence, the total asset holdings of the individual
evolve as,
Wt+1,ν = Wt,ν (1 + r
w
t ) + p̄, t− ν ∈ {0, ..., TR − 1} (working), (7)
where p̄ is the contribution paid (at the end of the period) and rwt denotes the return on
the asset portfolio, which is given by:
rwt = (1− ωp) rf + ωpret , (8)
where ωp is the fraction of the pension fund’s assets invested in equity, rf is the constant
return on the risk-free debt and ret is the return on equity. Each period in retirement, i.e.














, t− ν ∈ {TR, ..., TD − 1} (retired). (9)
This is a variable annuity of the type considered in Feldstein & Ranguelova (1998, 2001)
and Beetsma & Bucciol (2013). It differs from an annuity that pays out the same amount
each period. The advantage of the variable annuity is that it allows the individual to take
advantage of the equity premium.
2.2.3 The collective second pillar
Let us now turn to the collective pension fund. The advantage of the collective fund is
that risks can be shared over many cohorts of participants. Through their contributions
into the system, individuals accrue pension rights, bt,ν . At the start of the working life,
accrued pension entitlements are zero, bν,ν = 0. Pension entitlements evolve as follows:
bt+1,ν =
{
(1 + It)bt,ν + ψ, t− ν ∈ {1, ..., TR} (working)
(1 + It)bt,ν , t− ν ∈ {TR + 1, ..., TD} (retired)
, (10)
where It is the indexation rate and ψ is the accrual rate. The accrual is received at the
end of period t so that it is not heightened up by the indexation in period t. Notice that
all participants in the pension arrangement receive the same indexation.
7
The pension fund’s assets At+1 evolve as:
At+1 = (1 + r
p
t )At + T




where rpt is the return on the pension fund’s asset portfolio. Hence, the new level of
pension fund assets is equal to the old level multiplied by the gross portfolio return plus
total contribution payments, minus total benefit payments. We assume some given starting
level A0 for the pension fund’s assets. For convenience, we can set A0 = Ā, the target level
of assets to be discussed below. Note that, while contributions are identical for all cohorts in
a given period, this is not necessarily the case for the benefits. To facilitate the comparison
with the case of the IDC system, we assume that the composition of the fund’s portfolio
is the same as that of the IDC portfolio. Hence, the return on the pension fund’s portfolio
is:
rpt = (1− ωp) rf + ωpret , (12)
where ωp is the fraction of the pension fund’s assets invested in equity.
We evaluate the pension fund’s liabilities according to the so-called “Accumulated Ben-
efit Obligation” (ABO), which is the discounted sum of all future pension benefits, where its
calculation is done under the assumption that the benefit level throughout the retirement
period is equal to the current level of accrued entitlements. More specifically, this calcu-
lation ignores the further accrual of entitlements by current and future workers through
future contributions and the future indexation of entitlements for any current and future
participating cohorts. The question is what is the appropriate rate at which those benefits
should be discounted? If they are risk-free, they should be discounted at the risk-free rate
of interest. However, the indexation rate of the pension rights is stochastic, which makes
the cash flows stochastic as well. Risk aversion would justify a marginally higher discount
rate. Nevertheless, real-world pension arrangements, like the Dutch second pillar use the
market risk-free rate to calculate pension liabilities. We use the risk-free rate to discount






















Hence, liabilities consist of a component based on the current and future benefit payments
to the retired, the first term on the right-hand side of (13), and a component based on
future benefit payments to current workers, the second term on the right-hand side. The
first component takes the sum of a retired cohort’s benefits discounted to time t and then it
sums over all retired cohorts. The second component takes the sum of all benefit payments
as of retirement discounted back to time t.























The current liabilities consist of the present value of the previous liabilities corrected for
indexation, minus the present value of the pension payouts in the previous period corrected
for indexation (the second term on the right-hand side), plus the present value of newly
accumulated pension entitlements through the accrual obtained by all working cohorts (the
final term).
An important input for policy decisions is the so-called “funding ratio”, defined as:
Ft = At/Lt.
The funding ratio is subject to a lower bound F l and an upper bound F u. In reality,
boundaries on the funding ratio are frequently observed. In the context of the current
model, we conjecture that in the absence of such boundaries it would be optimal to not
have the fund’s steering instruments react at all to the funding ratio. This way shocks are
spread out over as many generations as possible. However, the funding ratio could then
reach very low or very high values that are clearly unrealistic. When it is substantially
below one, young cohorts could refuse to continue participating in the pension arrangement,
because the contributions they have to make to restore the fund’s financial position would
far outweigh the benefit they perceive to obtain when they are themselves old (e.g, see
Beetsma et al. (2012); Chen & Beetsma (2013)). By contrast, when the funding ratio
is substantially above unity, old generations could put pressure on the fund’s board to
dismantle the fund and distribute its assets over the participants (possibly in proportion
to the contributions that the various participating cohorts have made in the past), see,
for example, Penalva & Bommel (2011) and Beetsma & Romp (2013). Alternatively, the
government might want to tax some of the fund’s reserves away.
The pension fund aims at achieving a target F̄ for the funding ratio, with F̄ = 12(F
l +
F u), the average of the upper and lower bounds on the funding ratio. These bounds define
a proportionality parameter qF = 1 − F l/F̄ indicating the range over which the funding
rate can fluctuate. Based on the funding ratio Ft, the pension fund applies its steering
instruments, namely the pension contribution and the rate of indexation of the pension
entitlements. In response to a deviation of the funding ratio from its target level F̄ , the







p̄, g′α(.) ≤ 0, gα(1) = 0, g′α(1) = −α,
where p̄ is a target level for the pension contribution (to be discussed below). For gα we
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where F ∗t is defined as follows
F ∗t =

F̄ (1− 0.9qF ) for Ft < F̄ (1− 0.9qF )
Ft for Ft ∈
[
F̄ (1− 0.9qF ) , F̄ (1 + 0.9qF )
]
F̄ (1 + 0.9qF ) for Ft > F̄ (1 + 0.9qF )
.
Hence, if the funding ratio falls below its target (Ft < F̄ ), then the pension contribution
is raised, and vice versa.1 To prevent the adjustment in the contribution rate reaching
extreme values, the adjustment is kept constant as a function of Ft when Ft gets close
to its boundaries, i.e. when Ft < F̄ (1− 0.9qF ) or Ft > F̄ (1 + 0.9qF ). The reason is
that the ensuing discrete-time simulation of the model could lead to values of the funding
ratio so close to its boundaries that the adjustment in the contribution rate reaches totally
unrealistic levels and produces very sharp movements of the funding ratio in the direction
of the opposite boundary. If it were possible to simulate in continuous time this problem
would be avoided, because the funding ratio would likely have been pushed back towards
its long-run equilibrium value before it could get close to its boundaries. Moreover, the
adjustment of the contribution rate would only be short-lived if the funding ratio reaches
extreme values. Hence, the current specification ensures smooth adjustment policies for a
model that is simulated only at discrete time intervals.
Likewise, the rate of indexation of accumulated rights is made a function of the actual





, g′β(.) ≥ 0, gβ(1) = 0, g′β(1) = β,









F ∗t − F̄
qF F̄
)
In Figure 1, we graphically illustrate the policies of the pension fund as a function of the
funding ratio. In the left panel we observe that when the funding ratio is below its target,
the pension contribution is raised, while in the right panel we observe that the indexation of
pension rights increases if the funding ratio improves. The further the funding ratio moves
away from its target, the stronger the policy response. The vertical lines Ft/F̄ = F
l/F̄
1The simplest possible adjustment policy would have been one that is linear in Ft/F̄ . However, such a
specification leads to an unstable dynamic system of assets and liabilities. The Appendix contains a proof
of this feature.
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(a) adjustment policy pension contribution (b) indexation policy pension rights
Figure 1: Tangent hyperbolic policies of the pension fund.
and Ft/F̄ = F
u/F̄ are the asymptotes of the tangent hyperbolic functions.
2.2.4 Consistency among the targets
To avoid a situation in which pension rights need to be systematically revised into one
direction, the target levels for the pension contribution, the pension benefit and the funding
ratio need to be consistent among themselves. Concretely, in the absence of shocks, and
starting from a situation in which all variables are at their target levels, they should remain
at their target levels in the next period. For convenience, we refer to this situation as the
“steady state”. Based on the zero indexation when the funding ratio is at its target, we





(t− ν) b̄/TR, t− ν ∈ {1, ..., TR} (working)
b̄, t− ν ∈ {TR + 1, ..., TD} (retired)
. (15)
The target benefit level b̄ is a choice variable that determines the scale of the funded pension
pillar.2 We can substitute these expressions of b̄ for bt,ν into equation (13). This yields a
“target level” for the liabilities L̄. Given the target for the funding ratio, we obtain the
target asset level as Ā = F̄ L̄. Then, using (11), we obtain p̄ as:













2Alternatively, one can fix the target contribution level p̄ to set the size of the funded pension pillar.
11
We see that the target contribution is increasing in the length of the retirement period
TD − TR and the target benefit, but decreasing in the initial pension assets and the mean
net return on the portfolio. Moreover, assuming that the numerator of this expression is
positive, i.e. that not all the benefit payments can be financed out of the net return on
the pension assets, the target contribution is decreasing in the length of the contribution
period.3
2.3 The government
The government faces an exogenous and constant amount of primary spending Ḡ ≥ 0.
Further, it starts off with a given initial debt level D0. It places its debt on the international
capital market. Assuming that it pays off the debt with certainty, it pays the risk-free
interest rate on its debt. The dynamics of the debt D depend on the taxation regime.









Hence, debt at the start of the next period is current debt multiplied by its gross return,
plus primary government spending, minus total tax revenues, which is the number of
contributing cohorts times the size of a cohort (unity) times the individual tax payment.












where total tax revenues are the result of taxing income after the pension contribution has
been paid plus the taxation of the pension benefits received by the retired.
The government tries to limit the movements of the public debt by imposing both an
upper bound Du and a lower bound Dl on the debt. The upper bound resembles the ceiling
that the EU Treaty in principle imposes on the public debt. Such a ceiling would prevent
the debt from becoming unsustainable. In practice, the main concern is that debt becomes
too high, while there seems to be little concern about debt becoming too low. However, this
may be the consequence of the fact that debt levels have mostly been substantial in recent
history. Yet, there are also disadvantages to low or negative debt. For example, financial
markets would find it difficult to determine equilibrium interest rates if there is very little
debt to be traded, while if debt even becomes negative, hence the government becomes a
net creditor, the question is in which assets the government should invest. Moreover, being
3An alternative way of defining the target contribution is the “actuarially fair” contribution rate by
taking the present value of the pension rights – see, for example, Cui et al. (2011). However, this contribution
rate is higher, such that the pension fund creates a buffer when the funding ratio is close to its steady-state
level. This is at the cost of the current working cohorts, while young and future generations benefit from
these buffers.
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a large creditor, the government may be held hostage in its policies by its debtors.4 In line
with these arguments, we assume that besides an upper bound there is also a lower bound
on the public debt. The government aims at achieving a target level D̄ on its debt, with
D̄ = 12(D
l +Du).







, g′γ(.) ≥ 0, gγ(1) = 0, g′γ(1) = γ, (18)
where γ ≥ 0 and τ̄ is the target tax rate given by
τ̄ =
{ (
rf D̄ + Ḡ
)
/TR, if TEE(












The target tax rates differ between the TEE and EET regimes, as the government’s tax
revenues are different under the two regimes. Under the EET regime, the total tax revenues
are the sum of the revenues of taxing wage income after the pension contributions have





while total tax revenues under the TEE regime are obtained by taxing the gross wages
of all working generations TR. Similar to the case of the pension fund, we focus on the












with qD = 1 − Dl/D̄, a measure of how much government debt is allowed to fluctuate.
This implies that the tax rate equals its target level if debt also equals its target level.
Furthermore, to prevent the tax rate from achieving extreme values, we apply a cut-off to
D∗t when debt gets close to its boundaries. Hence, D
∗
t is given by
D∗t =

D̄ (1− 0.9qD) for Dt < D̄ (1− 0.9qD)
Dt for Dt ∈
[
D̄ (1− 0.9qD) , D (1 + 0.9qD)
]
.
D̄ (1 + 0.9qD) for Dt > D̄ (1 + 0.9qD)
Figure 2 graphically illustrates that when debt moves away from its target, the deviation
of the tax rate from its target becomes larger. The vertical lines Dt/D̄ = D
l/D̄ and
Dt/D̄ = D
u/D̄ are the asymptotes of the tangent hyperbolic function.
3 Calibration
We calibrate the individual life cycle as follows. Each generation starts working at the age
of 25, retires at the age of 65 (hence, TR = 40) and dies at the age of 85 (hence, TD = 60).
4In a way, this is the case for China, which holds such substantial amounts of U.S. public debt, that, in
order to avoid capital losses, it is forced to follow policies that do not unduly undermine the confidence in
the financial strength of the U.S. government.
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Figure 2: Tangent hyperbolic debt stabilization policies.
Hence, we follow each generation over a period of 60 years. We set the annual return on the
risk-free asset at rf = 2% and assume that the gross return on equity 1+ret is log-normally
distributed with equity premium parameter µe = 3% and volatility parameter σe = 15%.5
Hence, the expected gross return on equity is exp(rf + µe + 12(σ
e)2).
In view of the absence of capital as a production factor, we calculate GDP as aggregate
labour income. Therefore, given that each cohort is of size unity and that labour income is
unity, the GDP level is 1∗TR. The target debt level is set at D̄ = 30% of GDP and qD = 1.
Therefore, the lower and upper boundaries Dl and Du on the debt correspond to 0% and
60% of GDP, respectively. Further, government spending is set constant at Ḡ = 3313% of
GDP. The social security benefit is set constant at ζ = 20%, which implies a social security
tax of λ = 10%, because the length of retirement is half the length of working life and no
one dies prematurely.
Further, the target funding ratio is F̄ = 100% and qF = 0.3, implying funding ratios
between 70% and 130%. We calibrate the fraction of the pension fund’s assets invested in
equity as ωp = 0.50. The pension contribution and the accrual rate are calibrated such that





this is the optimal time profile for consumption in the absence of shocks. Hence, under
the TEE regime we calibrate such that 1− (λ+ p̄+ τ̄) = ζ + π̄ and under the EET regime
(1− p̄) (1− τ̄)− λ = ζ + (1− τ̄) π̄.
Table 1 summarises the calibration of the parameters. Further, with the above inputs
we can calculate steady states for the various regimes. For the individual EET regime we
have the steady-state variable annuity level ā = 0.5104 and p̄ = 0.0693 and τ̄ = 0.2861.
Hence, steady-state consumption is (1− p̄) (1− τ̄) − λ = ζ + (1− τ̄) ā = 0.5644. For the
individual TEE regime we find that ā = 0.3175, p̄ = 0.0431 and τ̄ = 0.3393, hence steady-
state consumption is 1− (λ+ p̄+ τ̄) = ζ + ā = 0.5175. For the collective EET regime we
find that ψ = 0.0141, Ā = L̄ = 247.21, b̄ = 0.5640, p̄ = 0.0250 and τ̄ = 0.2700. Hence,
5Dimson et al. (2011) suggest an expected annual equity premium in the range of 3− 3.5%. In line with
this, we assume an equity premium in our model of µe = 3%.
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Table 1: Calibration of parameters
Description Symbol Calibration
Return on risk-free asset rf 0.02
Equity premium parameter µe 0.03
Equity volatility parameter σe 0.15
Fraction invested in equity ωp 0.50
Subjective discount factor δ 1
1+rf
Relative risk aversion ρ 5
Age of death TD 60
Retirement age TR 40
Target funding ratio F̄ 1
Target debt D̄ 30% of GDP
Range of funding ratio boundaries qF 0.3
Range of debt boundaries qD 1
Social security benefit ζ 0.20
Government spending Ḡ 3313% of GDP
Accrual rate under collective EET ψ 0.0141
Accrual rate under collective TEE ψ 0.0086
Contribution rate under collective EET p̄ 0.0250
Contribution rate under collective TEE p̄ 0.0153
Contribution rate under EET individual DC p̄ 0.0693
Contribution rate under TEE individual DC p̄ 0.0431
steady-state consumption is (1− p̄) (1− τ̄) − λ = ζ + (1− τ̄) b̄ = 0.6118. Finally, for the
collective TEE regime, we obtain ψ = 0.0086, Ā = L̄ = 151.36, b̄ = 0.3453, p̄ = 0.0153 and
τ̄ = 0.3393. Hence, steady-state consumption is 1− (λ+ p̄+ τ̄) = ζ + b̄ = 0.5453.
4 Social welfare evaluation
We simulate N = 10, 000 paths for the equity returns and we assume that the economy
is in its steady state at time t = 0. There is hardly any adjustment close to time t = 0.
Hence, we evaluate the results after a “burn-in” period of 100 years, i.e. from time t = 100
onward.6 We evaluate the risk-sharing arrangements provided by the government and the
pension fund in terms of social welfare. Social welfare evaluated at time t = 100, SW , is







The discounted utility of the generation born in period ν converges to zero as ν goes to
infinity. Therefore, we simulate paths up to time t = 1000 - utility flows obtained after that
period will be negligible in their contribution to social welfare. To ease the welfare com-
parison of different arrangements, we calculate the certainty-equivalent consumption level
6Since we take a burn-in period of 100 years, the confidence intervals of all variables have converged,
which takes about 30 to 40 periods.
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CECSW , which is the constant consumption level over the lifetime of future generations








The Appendix shows that
CECSW =
(





To compare the different regimes in more detail, for a given parameter setting φ =
(α, β, γ, qF , qD) we define a number of Sharpe ratios. Compared to the certainty-equivalent
consumption level, they have the advantage of highlighting the effects of changes in ex-
pected consumption and the volatility of consumption in an intuitive measure if one changes
the system parameter values. First, we define the following Sharpe ratio for consumption















where the subscript n refers to the specific simulation run. Next, we define the Average
Lifetime Sharpe Ratio (ALSR) for consumption as
ALSR (φ) =
1









where we compute first the average Sharpe ratio of generation ν over it lifetime, which is
the part between the brackets, after which we take the average over the generations ν = 100
to ν = M ≥ 100. To deal with cases in which consumption is certain during working life,
we also define the Average Retirement Sharpe Ratio (ARSR) for consumption as
ARSR (φ) =
1









where the relevant average for a specific generation ν is not computed over its full lifetime,
but only over its retirement period.
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5 Outcomes
This section discusses the outcomes of our simulations. First, we discuss the results for
the individual pension scheme. Second, we investigate some specific collective pension
arrangements. Third, we consider general collective pension arrangements and explore the
effects of varying the hyperbolic adjustment policies. Fourth, we derive socially-optimal
combinations of risk-sharing parameters under different pension and taxation regimes.
5.1 IDC
As we abstract from wage uncertainty, there are no fluctuations in tax revenues under the
TEE regime, implying constant government debt and thus constant tax rates. However,
under the EET regime the government debt fluctuates, because the volatile annuity pay-
ments are also taxed. The intensity of the tax adjustment is determined by the parameter
γ. For high values of γ, even a small deviation of the government debt from its target
value results in substantial tax adjustments. For low values of γ, most of the adjustment
takes place when the government debt is close to its boundaries. This also leads to a
situation with highly volatile tax rates, because adjustments can be substantial when the
debt boundaries are approached. For values of γ lower than 0.25, the intensity of the tax
adjustment is so low that government debt attains unrealistic values. Hence, we only con-
sider values γ ≥ 0.25. Then, an interior optimum obtained at γ = 0.73. For the remainder
of this paper, we take this as our benchmark value of the tax adjustment policy parameter.
Figure 3 shows the mean simulation paths and the 90% confidence intervals around
those means for the IDC pension arrangement under both taxation regimes. The wel-
fare levels in terms of certainty equivalent consumption are 0.5457 and 0.5049 under the
EET and TEE regimes, respectively. The advantage of the EET regime is that individuals
can gain from additional investment returns due to the tax savings during working life.
The disadvantage of the EET regime is that, in contrast to the TEE regime, the tax rate
fluctuates, leading to higher consumption volatility under EET than under TEE. How-
ever, the former effect dominates the latter, which explains that the certainty-equivalent
consumption level is higher under EET than under TEE.
5.2 Collective pension arrangements
Recall that we have calibrated the accrual rates such that the steady state consumption
level is constant over life. Table 2 summarizes the steady state values of our variables that
were computed above.
5.2.1 Varying the boundaries on government debt and the funding ratio
The boundaries on the government debt and the funding ratio are important determinants
for the adjustment policies, as strong adjustments are required close to the boundaries.
First, we consider the EET regime, which is the relevant tax regime for most of the OECD
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Figure 3: IDC pension scheme (EET: γ = 0.73)
Table 2: Steady-state values collective model
Description Symbol EET TEE
Pension contribution p̄ 0.0250 0.0153
Pension benefit b̄ 0.5640 0.3453
Stabilization tax τ̄ 0.2700 0.3393
Consumption level c̄ 0.6118 0.5453
Government debt D̄ 12 12
Funding ratio F̄ 1 1
Liabilities L̄ 247.21 151.36
Assets Ā 247.21 151.36
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member countries. The investment portfolio of the pension fund is the source of risk, which
is eventually shared between the current and future participants though a variety of chan-
nels. Current participants absorb part of the risk through the fluctuations in indexation
and/or their pension contribution, which also causes tax revenues to fluctuate. Part of the
risk is absorbed in future periods and by future generations by letting the funding ratio
and the public debt (under the EET regime) vary between their boundaries.
Figure 4(a) shows the welfare effects of varying the widths of the bands on the govern-
ment debt and the funding ratio under the EET regime. Here, we assume α = 30, β = 0.5
and γ = 0.73. However, we investigate the effects of other parameter settings in detail
below. Welfare, as measured in terms of certainty equivalent consumption, rises if the
bands on the funding ratio and the debt level become wider. A wider band on the funding
ratio means that the indexation rate can be kept more stable, allowing for a more stable
retirement income. Similarly, a wider band on debt means that the tax rate can be kept
more stable, implying a more stable after-tax retirement income. In effect, wider bands on
the funding ratio and the public debt level allow for more intergenerational risk-sharing.
However, the welfare effects of widening these fluctuation margins are rather small. For
qF = 20% and qD = 50%, certainty equivalent consumption is 0.5641, while for qF = 120%
and qD = 150%, a substantial widening of both fluctuation margins, certainty-equivalent
consumption rises to 0.5660.
While most OECD member countries tax retirement benefits according to the EET
principle, some countries use a TEE regime.7 In our TEE model, only investment risk
affects the funding ratio and the consumption patterns of the participants. The government
does not absorb any of the uncertainty and, therefore, the debt is stable. Hence, in this
case the only relevant adjustment margins concern the contribution rate and the indexation
rate. Panel (b) of Figure 4 shows that a widening of the band on the funding ratio raises
social welfare under the TEE regime, because the scope for intergenerational risk-sharing
is enhanced. Quantitatively the effect is again rather small. Raising qF from 20% to 120%
lifts certainty-equivalent consumption by about 0.0016.
Panel (c) of Figure 4 shows that wider boundaries correspond to higher Sharpe ratios,
in line with the welfare effects shown in panels (a) and (b). A question is what causes a
widening of the bands on the funding ratio and the public debt to have only rather small
welfare effects. Figure 5 shows the frequencies of the funding ratio and the government
debt at time t = 100 based on N = 10, 000 simulation runs. Clearly, a widening of the
boundaries both on the funding ratio and on the public debt has only marginal effects
on the frequency distributions, in line with the small welfare effects. The skewness in the
frequency distributions is the result of the assumption of a log-normal distribution for the
equity returns, which is positively skewed.
For most of the remainder of this section we assume that the boundaries on the funding
ratio and government debt are given. Specifically, we set these boundaries again at the
7Luxembourg, Hungary and Poland have a TEE regime for pension taxation. Germany used to have a
TEE regime as well, but changed it to EET quite recently (Schonewille, 2007).
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(a) EET regime(α = 30, β = 0.5, γ = 0.73) (b) TEE regime(α = 30, β = 0.5)
(c) Average Lifetime Sharpe ratios of consumption(α = 30, β = 0.5, γ = 0.73)
Figure 4: Certainty equivalent consumption (panels (a) and (b)) and average lifetime
Sharpe ratio of consumption (panel (c)) corresponding to different boundary settings.
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Figure 5: Frequencies (based on 10, 000 simulations) for funding ratio and government debt
at time t = 100 corresponding to different boundary settings.
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Figure 6: Certainty equivalent consumption (CEC) and Average Retirement Sharpe Ratio
(ARSR) corresponding to different adjustment parameters, with α = 0 (CDC).
benchmark calibration values corresponding to qF = 30% and qD = 1.
5.2.2 The collective defined contribution (CDC) scheme
The first arrangement we consider is a CDC scheme, which features a fixed contribution
rate, i.e. α = 0, and a variable payout. Imbalances in the funding ratio will be restored
through indexation policy only. Under the TEE regime, due to the constant contribution
during working life, consumption is also constant during working life and the average
lifetime Sharpe ratio (ALSR) of consumption is not defined. Also, under the EET regime,
we get very large values for the ALSR because of the low volatility of consumption during
working life. Hence, for the CDC scheme we compare only the ARSRs.
In Figure 6, we depict the consequences of changing the indexation parameter β and
the tax stabilization parameter γ. The left panels show the welfare levels in terms of CEC
for different adjustment parameters γ and β, while the right panels show the corresponding
ARSR of consumption. In the two top panels, we vary the tax stabilization parameter γ
under the EET regime. We observe that a reduction in γ from a high level results in both
higher welfare and a higher ARSR, confirming that less aggressive intervention via taxes
when debt is not too close to its boundaries is beneficial, because it allows to better exploit
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intergenerational risk-sharing by allowing more fluctuation in the government debt.
The middle and bottom panels of Figure 6 show that an increase in the indexation
parameter β under both the EET and TEE regime raises welfare as expressed in certainty-
equivalent consumption and, in line with this, also results in a higher value of the ARSR.
Low values of β imply that changes in indexation tend to kick in only when the funding
ratio gets close to its boundaries, resulting in substantial correction, hence in relatively
large changes in pension entitlements. Hence, an increase in β essentially smooths the
adjustment in indexation as the funding ratio fluctuates and dampens the fluctuations in
entitlements.8
5.2.3 The defined-benefit (DB) scheme
The second specific regime is the DB scheme, which is obtained by setting β = 0. In this
case, fund imbalances are restored through adjustments in the contribution only, while
the retirement benefits are constant, as there is no (risky) indexation. Funding ratios
turn out to be unstable for α < 50. That is, they explode for some simulation paths,
because contribution adjustments are too small. This is no longer the case for α ≥ 50.
However, now, the volatility of the pension contribution becomes large, thereby resulting
in volatile consumption paths during working life. At α = 50, social welfare is 0.4605
and 0.4777 under the EET and TEE regime, respectively. A higher value of α raises the
volatility of the pension contribution. With this high value of α the higher volatility of the
pension contribution under the EET regime outweighs the effect of the higher expected
consumption under this regime and, hence, social welfare is lower under EET than under
TEE. Actually, for sufficiently large values of α in some scenarios contributions need to
be so large that consumption becomes negative. These results essentially confirm the view
that the contribution level has lost its power as a steering instrument for most pension
funds in the Netherlands and in particular for funds suffering from an ageing of their
population of participants. For such pension funds, in the absence of other instruments
the correction of deviations of the funding ratio from its target would require such large
and detrimental (for the economy) changes in the pension contribution that it becomes
practically impossible to stabilise the funding ratio.
5.2.4 The hybrid DB-DC scheme
The hybrid DB-DC pension scheme is obtained by setting α > 0 and β > 0. The panels
in the top row and the fourth row in Figure 7 show that compared to CDC (α = 0) the
hybrid regime can improve welfare for both EET and TEE, respectively. Hence, given β,
the possibility to vary contributions in response to the funding ratio is beneficial. This
8This finding supports the so-called “Adjustment-mechanism Financial Shocks” (AFS), which is planned
to be incorporated in the new Dutch pension contract. The mechanism allows for frequent, though relatively
small, adjustments of the pension entitlements in response to shocks, instead of infrequent, but abrupt,
adjustments. The maximum smoothing period of financial shocks under the AFS is ten years (Bovenberg
et al., 2012).
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way the burden of adjustment in response to shocks can be better spread over the entire
population than when α = 0 at the same level of β. Under CDC the adjustment burden
falls disproportionately on indexation and therefore on the retired, who hold most of the
entitlements. Welfare is increasing in α when α is not too high and decreasing in α when α
is relatively large. When α is large the burden of adjustment in response to shocks falls so
disproportionately on the working cohorts that a further increase in α leads to a reduction
in social welfare. Effectively the use of the fluctuation margin in the funding ratio for
intergenerational risk-sharing becomes minimal. The social optimum under both taxation
regimes is around α = 30 for β = 0.5 and γ = 0.73 under the EET regime and also around
α = 30 for β = 0.5 under the TEE regime.
The right panels of Figure 7 show both the ALSR (solid line, left vertical axis) and
the ARSR (dashed line, right vertical axis) of consumption. Not surprisingly, the ARSR is
rising in α. The higher is α, the larger is the adjustment burden on the working generations
and, hence, the more stable is consumption for the retired generations. The ALSR, which
is based on the Sharpe ratios of both the retired generations and the working generations
is decreasing in α. The increased uncertainty in consumption of the working generations
as α increases is now also weighed and in fact dominates the reduced instability of the
consumption of the elderly in the calculation of the ALSR. The trade-off between con-
sumption volatility during working life and during retirement is optimal when α is around
30, as shown in the corresponding left panels of Figure 7.
In the presence of a substantial adjustment burden via the pension contribution, it is
socially optimal to reduce the adjustment burden through indexation, as the second and
fifth row in Figure 7 show. For α = 30, the optimal value for β is around 0.27 and 0.19 in
the cases of the EET regime and the TEE regime, respectively (see the left panels of the
figure). Not surprisingly, the ARSR is falling with β, because the additional adjustment
burden associated with an increase in β falls relatively heavily on the elderly. Similar as
to the case under the CDC regime we observe that reducing γ is welfare enhancing – see
the left panel of the third row of Figure 7. Also the Sharpe ratios improve as γ falls.
5.2.5 Hyperbolic adjustment policies
We now take a closer look at the hyperbolic adjustment policies and explore to what extent
the various instruments can act as substitutes in producing intergenerational risk sharing.
Figure 8 shows certainty equivalent consumption for different combinations of adjustment
policies. The EET regime is considered in panels (a)-(d), where the TEE regime, under
which the tax rate is stable, is considered in panel (e).
Holding pension contributions constant, Figure 8(a) shows social welfare for different
combinations of the indexation and tax adjustment parameters. For low values of β fund
imbalances are reduced only slowly and abrupt changes in pension benefit levels in the
proximity of the boundaries on the funding rate are relatively frequent. Therefore, it is
welfare improving to increase β in order to keep the funding ratios more stable. A reduction
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Figure 7: Certainty equivalent consumption (CEC), Average Lifetime Sharpe Ratio
(ALSR) (solid line) and Average Retirement Sharpe Ratio (ARSR) (dashed line) of con-
sumption corresponding to different adjustment parameters under the hybrid DB-DC pen-
sion arrangement.
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(a) EET regime (CDC): debt stabilization and indexation
policy (α = 0)
(b) EET regime (hybrid): debt stabilization and indexa-
tion policy (α = 30)
(c) EET regime: contribution adjustment and debt sta-
bilization (β = 0.5)
(d) EET regime: contribution adjustment and indexation
policy (γ = 0.73)
(e) TEE regime: contribution adjustment and indexation
policy
Figure 8: Certainty equivalent consumption corresponding to adjustment parameters.
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in γ implies higher welfare, as a lower γ corresponds to less volatile taxes. For example, for
β = 0.15 and γ = 1.20, CEC = 0.4994, while for β = 1.50 and γ = 0.25, CEC = 0.5447.
Figure 8(b) shows the welfare effects when we also employ contributions as an adjust-
ment policy. We set α = 30. The optimal tax adjustment parameter depends on the
indexation policy. As we have seen earlier, large adjustments to indexation lead to volatile
retirement income, which in turn causes tax revenues to be more volatile. Effectively, for
higher β government debt absorbs more equity risk, which can be stabilized by increasing
the intensity of tax rate adjustments. Hence, Figure 8(b) shows that for low β the op-
timal tax adjustment parameter γ is low, while for high β the optimal value of γ is also
high. This indicates that the two risk sharing channels (indexation and debt policy) serve
as complements. However, the differences in the welfare level between the scenarios are
rather small. Moving from (β = 1.25, γ = 1.10) to β = γ = 0.25 lifts welfare by about 0.02.
We will now explore how social welfare reacts to changing combinations of the contri-
bution and indexation parameters, holding the tax adjustment parameter constant, and
to changing combinations of the contribution and tax adjustment parameters, holding the
indexation parameter constant – see panels (c), (d) and (e) of Figure 8. We reach a num-
ber of interesting findings. First, for both a given indexation parameter and a given tax
adjustment parameter, we see that the contribution adjustment parameter achieves an in-
terior optimum - see panel (c) of Figure 8. For very low values of α, much of the necessary
adjustment takes place when the funding ratio is close to its boundaries, in which case
the adjustment in the contribution is quite large, thereby feeding a lot of fluctuation into
disposable income of the workers. Similarly, for high values of α there is relatively strong
intervention when the funding ratio deviates only by a small amount from its target level,
again implying relatively strong fluctuations in disposable income. The optimal value of α
trades off these two effects and is found in between these extremes. Second, as panel (d)
of Figure 8 shows, if β increases, more and more of the adjustment takes place through
changing the indexation rate, hence the effect of varying α becomes weaker. In other
words, these adjustment policies act as substitutes. Furthermore, in line with our earlier
discussions of the DB and the hybrid systems, when α is close to zero, an increase in β
is welfare enhancing, while the opposite is true for larger values of α. These findings are
qualitatively replicated in the case of the TEE regime - see panel (e) of Figure 8.
5.3 Social welfare comparison
In this section we calculate and compare social welfare under the different tax and pension
regimes. First, we consider the CDC scheme, characterised by α = 0. In Section 5.2.2
we already saw that in this case welfare can be raised by employing indexation policy, i.e.
β > 0. However, when β becomes too large, the adjustment in indexation becomes so
large that the funding ratio starts bouncing between the two boundaries from year to year.
To avoid this, we restrict indexation policy to β ≤ 1.5. It turns out that under both tax
regimes welfare under CDC is maximised at the boundary of this constraint. Second, we
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Table 3: Optimal designs and welfare levels under different pension schemes.
description formula/symbol IDC CDC DB hybrid
EET regime (γ = 0.73)
contribution adjustment α - (0.0) 50.0 18.6
indexation adjustment β - 1.5 (0.0) 0.15
steady state consumption c̄ 0.5644 0.6118 0.6118 0.6118
social welfare CEC 0.5457 0.5448 0.4605 0.5698
welfare over individual scheme (in %) CEC−CEC
ind
CECind
0.00 -0.16 -15.61 4.42
deviation from steady state (in %) CEC−c̄c̄ -3.31 -10.94 -24.72 -6.86
corrected welfare level CECcorr 0.4989 0.4506 0.3663 0.4756
TEE regime
contribution adjustment α - (0.0) 50.0 20.4
indexation adjustment β - 1.5 (0.0) 0.15
steady state consumption c̄ 0.5175 0.5453 0.5453 0.5453
social welfare CEC 0.5049 0.5028 0.4777 0.5226
welfare over individual scheme (in %) CEC−CEC
ind
CECind
0.00 -0.42 -5.39 3.51
deviation from steady state (in %) CEC−c̄c̄ -2.44 -7.80 -12.40 -4.16
corrected welfare level CECcorr 0.5049 0.4750 0.4499 0.4948
consider the DB pension scheme. The pension benefits are fixed by setting β = 0. We limit
ourselves to values of the contribution parameter of α ≥ 50, because lower values result
in unstable funding ratios, as discussed in Section 5.2.3. This constraint on α is binding
under the optimal DB pension scheme, i.e. α = 50, for both tax regimes.
Third, we consider hybrid pension schemes, i.e. α and β are allowed to be positive at
the same time. To avoid exploding funding ratios or funding ratios that bounce between
their limits from year to year, we limit β to the interval 0.15 ≤ β ≤ 1.50. The optimal
combination of α and β under this restriction yields a value of β at its boundary 0.15,
while α = 18.6 under the EET regime and α = 20.4 under the TEE regime.
So far, we have made welfare comparisons for given regimes when we vary the pa-
rameters for the fund contribution, the indexation of pension entitlements and taxation.
However, we have not made any comparison across regimes. The socially-optimal param-
eter settings under the different pension regimes and the corresponding welfare levels in
terms of certainty-equivalent consumption are shown in Table 3. The highest welfare level
(CEC = 0.5698) is obtained under the hybrid collective pension scheme with EET and the
lowest welfare level (CEC = 0.4605) is obtained under the DB scheme with EET. Further-
more, we observe that for the chosen adjustment parameter values the hybrid collective
schemes outperform the individual schemes under both pension taxation regimes. This is in
particular the case under the EET regime, for which the hybrid collective scheme produces
a welfare gain of 0.0442 over the IDC scheme. However, the latter scheme outperforms
the CDC and DB schemes. The DB scheme in particular exhibits low welfare levels. This
is due to the large volatility of the pension contributions, which is needed to stabilise the
funding ratio as discussed in Section 5.2.3.
Notice that the comparison across the various regimes is affected by differences in the
28
(a) CDC & EET (α = 0.0, β = 1.50, γ = 0.73) (b) CDC & TEE (α = 0.0, β = 1.50)
(c) DB & EET (α = 50.0, β = 0.0, γ = 0.73) (d) DB & TEE (α = 50.0, β = 0.0)
(e) hybrid & EET (α = 18.6, β = 0.15, γ = 0.73) (f) hybrid & TEE (α = 20.4, β = 0.15)
Figure 9: Lifetime consumption generation ν = 100
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steady-state consumption levels. Steady-state consumption is higher under the collective
schemes than under the individual scheme. The reason is that the collective pension
fund already has a substantial amount of assets when a participant enters, while wealth
starts at zero under the individual pension scheme. The high level of pension fund assets
at the moment of entry into the fund allows for a fast accrual of pension entitlements
that exceeds the speed of pension wealth accrual under the individual scheme, especially
for those who are still young. In addition, as already explained in Section 5.1, steady-
state consumption levels are higher under the EET regime than under the TEE regime,
because by postponing taxation individuals can gain from additional investment returns.
However, as illustrated by Figure 9 for the collective schemes for the lifetime consumption
of generation ν = 100, the 90%-confidence bands on consumption are always wider under
EET as well. Nevertheless, at the given degree of risk aversion, the advantage of the
higher average consumption level under the EET regime dominates its disadvantage of
more volatile retirement income.
To explore how the various regimes fare in terms of the risks that their participants
run, we calculate the fractional deviation of certainty-equivalent consumption from steady-
state consumption. Based on this criterion, the individual schemes would actually perform
best, as certainty-equivalent consumption falls short of steady-state consumption by only
0.0331 and 0.0244 under the EET and TEE regimes, respectively. Interestingly, the per-
centage deviation from steady state is smaller under the TEE regime than under the EET
regime.9 An alternative way of comparing the performance in terms of participants’ risks
is the following. The lowest steady-state consumption level, which we refer to as c̄low, was
obtained for the IDC pension plan under the TEE regime, i.e. c̄low = 0.5175. We now
define a “corrected welfare measure” CECcorr, which is obtained by subtracting from the
original welfare measure a correction term equal to the difference between the steady state
consumption c̄ of the scheme under consideration and that of the scheme with the low-
est steady-state level of consumption, c̄low . Concretely, the corrected welfare measure is
CECcorr = CEC−(c̄− c̄low). Table 3 shows that on the basis of this corrected measure the
individual schemes outperform the collective schemes, while the TEE regimes outperform
the corresponding EET regimes.
This section suggests some potentially important policy conclusions. Overall, the col-
lective pension scheme outperforms the individual scheme, but only when both the con-
tribution and indexation adjustment policies can be simultaneously employed to share the
risks. The same result was obtained by Cui et al. (2011). Further, for given adjustment
parameters for the contribution and indexation, EET outperforms TEE. However, the rel-
ative performances of the various schemes may to a large extent be driven by differences
in average consumption under the different schemes.
9This is reminiscent of the result of Gollier (2008) that intergenerational risk-sharing is welfare improving,
as the expected return increases. However, intergenerational risk-sharing does not necessarily lead to
reduced risk.
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5.4 Pension fund portfolio risk and risk sharing through the public bud-
get
In this subsection we explore the relationship between the riskiness of the portfolio of the
pension fund and the optimal choice of the tax smoothing parameter γ. Higher portfolio
risk ωp of the fund raises the volatility of tax revenues under the EET regime, implying
larger fluctuations in the public debt. Because tax revenues and debt are constant under the
TEE regime, here we confine ourselves to the EET regime. Again the optimal choice of γ
involves a trade-off. If γ is low, the adjustment only takes place when the government debt
is close to its boundaries, implying relatively infrequent, but rather abrupt adjustments,
while if γ is high, small deviations of debt from its target already lead to substantial
adjustment. The optimal tax adjustment policy trades off these two effects, resulting in
an interior optimum for γ. However, again if γ is close to zero, due to the discreteness
of the simulations, for some simulation runs government debt levels go far beyond their
boundaries. To exclude such scenarios we impose that γ ≥ 0.25.
5.4.1 IDC
Figure 10(a) shows the interaction of portfolio risk and the tax smoothing policy under
the IDC pension scheme. We can distinguish two types of investment portfolios. First, for
the relatively high-risk portfolios, 0.44 < ωp ≤ 1, the optimal tax stabilization parameter
is an interior solution. For those relatively high-risk portfolios, a higher share of equity
investment ωp results in a lower optimal value of γ, because more pension fund risk would
call for more risk sharing via the public debt so as to have all generations share in the risk.
Second, for relatively low-risk portfolios, 0 ≤ ωp ≤ 0.44, the need for increasing γ, in order
to keep the public debt away from its boundaries, is dominated by the need for smoothing
the tax rate. In this case the optimal tax stabilization parameter γ equals its lower bound,
γ = 0.25.
5.4.2 Collective pension arrangements
We now turn to the collective pension arrangements – see Figure 10(b). In line with the
analysis in Section 5.3, we set α = 0 and β = 1.5 under the CDC pension scheme and
α = 18.6 and β = 0.15 under the hybrid pension scheme. Consider first the CDC scheme.
The right top panel of Figure 10(b) shows that more pension fund risk would call for
more risk sharing through the public debt, as the optimal γ decreases. Regarding the
hybrid pension scheme, we can again distinguish two portfolio risk categories. For the low-
risk portfolios, 0 ≤ ωp ≤ 0.52, the optimal tax stabilization parameter γ equals its lower
bound γ = 0.25, implying that it is welfare improving to provide as much tax smoothing
as possible. For the high risk portfolios, 0.52 < ωp ≤ 0.70, the optimal tax stabilization
parameter is an interior solution, similar to the case of the IDC pension scheme. We do not
show the results for ωp > 0.70, as we obtain unrealistically large funding ratio imbalances.
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(a) IDC pension arrangement (b) Collective pension arrangements
Figure 10: Interaction portfolio risk and optimal tax smoothing.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied intergenerational risk-sharing when funded pensions and public debt
can be simultaneously employed for this purpose. We considered two possible instruments
to stabilise pension funding ratios, namely the pension contribution and the indexation of
pension rights. In addition we considered two possible tax regimes, EET and TEE. Under
the former, pension contributions are paid before taxes and the pension accumulation
phase is untaxed, while pension benefits are taxed. Under the TEE regime, the pension
contribution is paid after taxes, while the other two phases are untaxed.
We obtained several noteworthy results from our analysis. First, comparing the tax
regimes, under EET participants in a pension scheme are effectively able to save a larger
proportion of income for their retirement than under TEE and, therefore, benefit more
from the positive expected equity premium. However, this also leads to more volatile
consumption paths due to tax policy aimed at stabilising public debt. From a welfare per-
spective, and regardless of whether we consider an individual or collective pension scheme,
the former effect dominates the latter, hence EET outperforms TEE. Second, among the
collective schemes, we observe that the hybrid scheme performs better than both the DB
scheme and the CDC scheme. The advantage of the hybrid scheme is that by having both
contributions and indexation respond to funding ratio imbalances, the volatility of con-
sumption during working life and during retirement can be better balanced. Third, our
findings suggest the existence of trade-offs concerning the parameters regulating the pen-
sion contribution and the indexation of entitlements. For a CDC scheme, it is optimal to
have indexation respond strongly to deviations in the funding ratio from its target, while
the opposite is found when the contribution reacts relatively strongly to such deviations.
Further, for given indexation parameter, we find an internal optimum for the responsiveness
of the contribution to the funding ratio. Finally, we observe that the degree of indexation
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of entitlements and the responsiveness of the tax rate to deviations of debt from its target
are complements. A higher indexation of pension rights implies stronger movements in
the retirement benefits, hence stronger fluctuations in tax revenues, thereby necessitating
stronger adjustments in the tax rate. These findings may give us some useful leads for
pension system design. For example, as part of the new pension contract in the Nether-
lands, it is agreed that the contribution rate will on average across the sectors no longer be
increased, implying that this channel for sharing risks would be weakened. Alternatively,
if one envisages to strengthen the role of contributions in facilitating intergenerational risk
sharing, then this is an argument for raising the retirement age, such that for a given level
of pension benefits the contribution can be reduced on average and more room is created
for allowing it to fluctuate around this average. Fourth, while the hybrid collective scheme
dominates the IDC overall in terms of welfare, the latter scheme is associated with lower
consumption volatility and on this account IDC is the best-performing scheme. Hence,
the opportunity to share risks across generations may actually come at the price of higher
consumption volatility. Fifth, the degree of riskiness of the pension fund’s asset portfolio
affects the volatility of tax revenues under the EET scheme, thereby affecting the optimal
tax adjustment parameter.
This paper can potentially be extended into a number of directions. First, our model
could be extended with a third pension pillar based voluntary personal savings. This way,
participants can make use of both intergenerational risk-sharing and attain their optimal
life cycle investment strategy. However, this extension will make the simulations far more
computationally intense and the question is whether it makes the model more realistic,
because free savings in countries with substantial funded pension pillars tend to be quite
low. Second, the model can be extended by considering flexible investment portfolios.
Third, the model could be extended by making the labour supply endogenous. Fourth,
future extensions could consider additional sources of risk, such risks in mortality, fertility
and wage rates. The question is whether this will have consequences for the policy trade-offs
that we have identified. After all, our policy adjustment parameters respond to deviations
of the pension funding ratio and public debt from their targets, irrespective of the factors
that cause them to move away from their targets. Finally, we have taken the size of the
PAYG first pillar as given. It would be particularly interesting to explore the consequences
of varying the size of this pillar when introducing wage and demographic risks, because
a PAYG arrangement is relatively effective in sharing these risks. One would also expect
that, with a larger PAYG pillar, the size of our second-pillar arrangements would need to
be reduced to smooth consumption over the life cycle. This, in turn, would mean that the
welfare differences among our second-pillar arrangements will become smaller.
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A Derivations
A.1 Asset-liability-dynamics with linear adjustment policies
Here we show that we have an unstable system of the pension fund’s asset-liability-dynamics
in case we have linear adjustment policies instead of the tangent hyperbolic functions.















































































and we can write the assets as follows
At+1 = (1 + r
p




































In the steady state, the following equations hold:
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2 + r̄p + rf − θ − η −
√






2 + r̄p + rf − θ − η +
√
(rf − r̄p)2 + 2(θ − η)(rf − r̄p) + (η + θ)2
)
Here we will discuss several properties of these eigenvalues. First, we have that λ2 > λ1,
which is shown by:
min
θ
λ2 − λ1 = min
θ
√
(rf − r̄p)2 + 2(θ − η)(rf − r̄p) + (η + θ)2
= 2
√
η(r̄p − rf ) (with θ∗ = r̄p − rf − η)
≥ 0.
Second, the mininum value obtained for λ2 > 1, as we have
min
η,θ≥0
λ2 = 1 + r
f > 1
This means that the pension system is unstable when we use linear adjustment policies,
as there is always one eigenvalue greater than one. Hence, the asset-liability-dynamics do
not converge after a shock occurs.
Furthermore, if we have λ1 = 1, then








(rf − r̄p(1 + rf ))B̄ + (1 + rf )r̄pL̄










and if we have λ1 = 0, then
θ = 1 + r̄p − η 1 + r̄
p
1 + rf
⇔ β = (1 + r̄
p)L̄− αP̄
(1 + r̄p)L̄− r̄pB̄
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